- 19:29
Lebanon’s upcoming parliamentary elections, coming on the heels of the 2024 Hezbollah–Israel war that devastated the organization and its core constituencies, have reopened the question of Shia political representation.
For decades, Lebanese political discourse has treated the Shia community as a unified political bloc, electorally disciplined, and ideologically aligned behind a single leadership. This assumption, reinforced by successive parliamentary outcomes, has allowed the alliance between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement to present itself as the sole legitimate representative of Shia political will.
Yet beneath this appearance of unanimity lies a far more complex reality, one that has remained largely invisible due to coercion, clientelism, and the systematic marginalization of dissent. As Lebanon prepares for parliamentary elections, tentatively scheduled for May, This is Beirut interviewed Shia opposition figures about their campaigns.
Shattering the Myth
Three main Shia opposition political movements have emerged to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections: the Taharror Movement, the Lebanese Democratic Coalition (LDC), and Tayyar al-Taghyeer Fi al-Janoub.
Although these political activists have nuanced differences, they all share the view that Shia political representation in Lebanon has been effectively monopolized and no longer reflects the realities or aspirations of a significant segment of the Shia community.
Shia political opponents of Hezbollah and Amal point out that while the two parties have dominated Shia representation in the Lebanese political system, this does not mean they have universal support among their constituencies.
In the 2022 parliamentary elections, approximately half of the 1.1 million eligible Shia voters abstained from casting ballots. Shia political opposition groups see this as a meaningful indicator that broad segments of the community feel unrepresented by Hezbollah and Amal, despite being counted electorally as the dominant duo’s base. The activists aim to capitalize on this gap between representation and reality.
The Taharror Movement: Direct Defiance
Emerging publicly in late 2023, the Taharror Movement (Liberation Movement) argues that Hezbollah and Amal’s duopoly cannot be dismantled from outside the Shia community through cross-sectarian reformist slogans but must instead be challenged from within the sect itself.
What distinguishes Taharror from other Shia opposition initiatives is its refusal to separate reforms from the issue of Hezbollah’s arms, which the Lebanese government committed to confiscating in August 2025.
The Taharror movement also openly supports Lebanon pursuing a peace agreement with Israel. “When we adopt the peace agreement with Israel, we will succeed in disarming Hezbollah because, in a situation of peace, there will be no more need for arms outside of the state,” Taharror president Ali Khalife said in an interview with This is Beirut.
He argued that peace with Israel is essential for the country’s long-term stability, economic recovery, and safety of its citizens, a proposal vehemently opposed by Hezbollah and Amal.
Where many reformist actors emphasize corruption, accountability, or institutional failure while treating Hezbollah’s weapons and peace with Israel as a deferred issue, Taharror places it at the center of its political platform.
The movement unequivocally calls for exclusive state authority over arms in Lebanon, rejecting proposed “containment” measures that stop short of confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons. “When you deal with a terror organization, you don't go into discussion for the sake of talking. You deal with the criminal organization,” he said.
Khalife plans to contest the single Shia seat in the Jbeil–Keserwan district, currently held by Hezbollah’s Raed Berro, who won it in the 2022 elections. “Shia voters are not naturally aligned with Hezbollah,” he said.
Instead, Khalife argued, their support for Hezbollah is “enforced through fear, services, and the constant message that there is no alternative.”
The Shia political activist explained that his party’s other planks include “restoring Lebanon to a modern and sovereign state,” one with strong, reliable institutions, a stable economy, and trust and credibility within the government. He said he will focus on the Shia community’s youth, whom he argued are more open and receptive to his ideas.
Lebanese Democratic Coalition: Opposition through Institutions
The oldest of the three main Shia opposition groups, the Lebanese Democratic Coalition (LDC) was co-founded in 2008 by Lokman Slim, a prominent intellectual and critic of Hezbollah who was assassinated in mysterious circumstances in south Lebanon in February 2021. Prior to his murder, Slim stated in writing that Hezbollah and Amal would bear responsibility if he were killed.
The LDC seeks to institutionalize dissenting Shia positions, confront extremism, uphold the constitution, and pursue change from within the state rather than through confrontation outside of it.
The organization’s president, Jad al-Akhawi, explained to This is Beirut that it seeks to erode Hezbollah’s political monopoly over time, betting that institutional legitimacy can gradually displace coercive authority.
Akhawi is weighing a bid for one of the Baabda district’s two Shia seats, currently held by Hezbollah’s Ali Ammar and Amal’s Fadi Alameh. Given the district’s sectarian diversity, which includes three Maronite and one Druze seat, Akhawi said his plank must be “nationalistic.”
If he runs, Akhawi said, it will be on a central message: “We have to go back to the government, to the institutions, to the state.” He presented the issue as a broader constitutional and legal necessity.
He said the LDC supports Hezbollah’s disarmament, adding, “The arms are to protect the organized crime, not the Shia. They protect money laundering, Captagon, and other criminal operations.”
The LDC does not aim to attract Shia voters firmly aligned with Hezbollah but instead wants to engage those who are more ideologically flexible in their views. Akhawi argued that Shia voters can see through Hezbollah’s messaging that it needs to keep its arms.
“In reality, they no longer hold that power,” he said.
Tayyar al-Taghyeer Fi al-Janoub: Local and Secular
Formed in 2022, Tayyar al-Taghyeer Fi al-Janoub (Movement for Change in the South) traces its origins to the nationwide October 17, 2019 protests against establishment Lebanese political parties, endemic corruption, and economic collapse.
Ali Mourad, a leading figure in the movement, told This is Beirut that he will be running in the South III district — encompassing Bint Jbeil, Nabatieh and Marjayoun — which includes three Shia parliamentary seats that have been held by Amal and Hezbollah members for decades.
Tayyar al-Taghyeer Fi al-Janoub’s decision to enter the electoral battle was not based on a calculus of winning or losing, according to Mourad. “We have a responsibility to offer an alternative voice,” he said.
Unlike many Shia opposition groups, Tayyar al-Taghyeer Fi al-Janoub avoids sectarian framing in its messaging. “We don't qualify ourselves politically as Shia under this brand of opposition. We are secular political activists,” he said.
The movement is guided by principles of sovereignty, justice, and accountability, Mourad said, linking these aims to Hezbollah’s disarmament, the resolution of Lebanon’s socio-economic crises, and the return of conflict-displaced residents of the south to their homes. In his view, disarming Hezbollah is essential for achieving these objectives.
The group centers its platform on livelihood concerns, including degraded roads, electricity shortages, healthcare access, and economic opportunity, accusing Hezbollah and Amal of having “failed the south.” Mourad said that because Hezbollah triggered the conflict with Israel, it bears responsibility for rebuilding homes and infrastructure damaged in the fighting.
By emphasizing bread-and-butter concerns over identity politics, Tayyar al-Taghyeer Fi al-Janoub is seeking to appeal to voters who are reluctant to make a symbolic break with Hezbollah but have grown increasingly frustrated by mounting everyday hardships.
Looking Forward
For the opposition candidates, the elections are about more than winning seats; they are a chance to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance and reclaim political representation for the Shia community.
Speaking on the stakes of the 2026 parliamentary elections, Khalife concluded: “We will save the state and ourselves, and we will try to build something for the future. This is the only way. If not, we will be lost.”
Comments