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3. No-State Zones in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Parallel State in Southern Lebanon and Beirut’s Southern Suburbs (3/3)

Two flags still fly side by side on some hills in southern Lebanon: The Lebanese flag and Hezbollah’s yellow flag. The first symbolizes a weakened state, the second a parallel power that has filled the void left by the Republic. Here, official authority often ends where the Shia group’s control begins.

A Fully Administered Territory

From the Litani River to the Israeli border, southern Lebanon has long operated like a state within a state. Hezbollah has maintained full control over security, justice, social services, and even the economy. The militia’s flags, institutions, courts, and welfare networks have filled the void left by a weak or absent public administration.

In the villages of Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Khiam, and Nabatiyeh, residents do not rely on the governor or government ministries. Instead, they turn to the local Hezbollah representative, who settles disputes, manages social assistance, coordinates the rebuilding of homes destroyed in successive Israeli wars, and maintains “security” across the area through the group’s members and fighters.

This takeover of state functions by a political-military militia structure consolidated after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah, riding the prestige of the “resistance,” stepped into the administrative and moral void left by the central government. Since then, it has managed the territory like a quasi-government, with its own rules, bureaucracy, and internal Islamic courts.

Parallel Justice and an Extensive Social and Economic Network

In southern Lebanon, few citizens go through the state courts. Civil, commercial, and family disputes are settled by Hezbollah’s religious courts. These internal tribunals operate quickly, with low fees, and with a level of efficiency that many consider superior to public courts, often bogged down by corruption and bureaucratic delays.

That efficiency, however, comes at a cost: political loyalty.

“Here, you get justice only if you are on the right side; otherwise, you remain silent,” a source told This is Beirut. “You never see the state, while the group is always present,” they added.

This parallel judicial system, based on Shia Islamic law and Hezbollah’s internal code, reinforces the group’s legitimacy. It ties the population into a relationship of dependence, where justice becomes a currency of loyalty.

This parallel judicial system, based on Shia Islamic law and Hezbollah’s internal code, reinforces the group’s legitimacy. It ties the population into a relationship of dependence, where justice becomes the currency of loyalty.

Moreover, in social and economic terms, Hezbollah has succeeded since the 1990s in developing an unprecedented social infrastructure. Hospitals, clinics, schools, charitable organizations, construction companies, and electricity and water networks—these institutions have enabled the group to build a genuine parallel welfare state, funded by Tehran as well as international financial networks, local donations, and the zakat, a religious tax on wealth and property regarded as a duty before God.

The Jihad el-Bina Association, Hezbollah’s reconstruction arm, rebuilt thousands of homes after the 2006 war. It plans to do the same following the renewed conflict with Israel that began on October 7, 2023. Residents still speak gratefully about the speed and efficiency of these efforts, in striking contrast to the inaction of the central government, as if the war were the state’s responsibility. This appreciation helps explain, in part, Hezbollah’s deep entrenchment: the group asserts itself not only through force but also through the social services and sense of protection it provides to its supporters.

A Zone Under Continuous Military Surveillance

In terms of security, despite the Lebanese army’s ongoing efforts to assert control over the region and mounting Israeli and international pressure on Hezbollah’s disarmament, southern Lebanon remains under the militia’s watch. Officially, Hezbollah is no longer allowed to deploy armed fighters, but in practice its members move freely, often posing as civilians or local security personnel.

However, a military source interviewed by This is Beirut noted, “There are almost no longer permanent training camps like there used to be in the Bekaa mountains.” Repeated Israeli strikes and international monitoring have forced the group to change its methods and disperse its structures.

Aware of this reality, official authorities seem to practice a form of pragmatic tolerance: as long as the border remains calm, the militia’s presence is largely overlooked.

For the Israelis, however, this strategy is no longer an option. Returning to the situation that existed before October 7, 2023, is now unthinkable. The situation must change, especially as Western intelligence increasingly reports intensified logistical movements and rearmament north of the Litani River, in violation of the ceasefire agreement established in November 2024.

Regarding the Lebanese army, an officer told This is Beirut: “The military does what it can with the resources available. We cannot be everywhere at once. The country may be small, but it is fragmented, and our troops must cover the borders, internal crises, fires, and protests, simultaneously.”

Beirut’s Southern Suburbs: Hezbollah’s Invisible Capital

The center of Hezbollah’s power lies in Dahyeh, the southern suburbs of Beirut, the place where the hearts of its top leaders stopped beating. While the region was strongly shaken following the death of the group’s former secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, on September 27, 2024, it has long served as Hezbollah’s administrative, financial, and ideological hub. Here, official ministries and authorities have no authority over security, traffic, or urban planning except in the case of major incidents involving weapons.

Portraits of Hassan Nasrallah have replaced the symbols of the Republic, the group’s checkpoints regulate access, and the Lebanese police intervene only occasionally, often in informal coordination with Hezbollah officials.

Within this concrete enclave, the group’s institutions – al-Imdad, the Waad project, al-Manar, and the Jihad el-Bina Association – create a fully integrated ecosystem.

Most residents, many from families displaced from the South and the Bekaa, find subsidized housing, medical care, schools, scholarships, and security. This comfort comes at a price: unwavering political loyalty. Life is good, provided one embraces the militia’s narrative and keeps any dissent to oneself.

Direct Link to Tehran

Hezbollah answers not to Beirut but to Tehran. Funding, military training, strategic guidance, and operational decisions all go through the Iranian chain of command. This external dependence, combined with the breakdown of the Lebanese state, creates a dual sovereignty: The Republic’s authority, which exists on paper, and Hezbollah’s, which is real and deeply rooted.

Every attempt by the state to reassert control in southern Lebanon has run up against the wall of the balance of power. “Hezbollah will never agree to give up a territory that is simultaneously its political stronghold, its military sanctuary, and its source of social legitimacy,” says the military official interviewed. The idea of gradually reintegrating the south under central authority, as proposed in the 2025 disarmament plan, therefore seems largely illusory. “In reality, Hezbollah has not replaced the state,” he adds, “it has absorbed it.”

This reality shows what happens to a territory when the state pulls back: an enclave where force and political loyalty replace institutions. In such areas, where official authority withdraws, the Republic exists only on paper.