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3. The End of an Era: Hezbollah Without Its Anchor

September 27, 2024, marked a turning point for Hezbollah. At 6:30 PM, a powerful shockwave tore through Beirut’s southern suburb and its surroundings, but the deeper tremor was political. In a matter of seconds, the “Party of God” entered free fall. Hassan Nasrallah, the movement’s towering figure, its uncontested leader and the symbol of a pro-Iranian force long regarded as untouchable, was killed in an Israeli strike.

This was more than the loss of a commander. It was the collapse of a central pillar. From that moment, Hezbollah’s politico-military machine, once seen as invincible, began to fracture. Cracks surfaced, contradictions deepened and its influence began to erode. Analysts noted that the assassination exposed both the depth of Israeli penetration into Hezbollah’s security apparatus and the exhaustion of a system built around a single man. With Nasrallah gone, the armed wing lost its strategist and ideological anchor, leaving it increasingly vulnerable.

For Hezbollah’s supporters, and for the wider Lebanese public, signs of military decline multiplied. The organization, long portrayed as unbeatable, scrambled to reassemble its leadership. The new command, fragmented and deprived of Nasrallah’s unifying vision, struggled to maintain cohesion.

On the battlefield, losses mounted into the thousands. Israeli strikes extended far beyond the South, reaching the Beqaa and Hermel. The militia, once able to dictate the rhythm of confrontation, found itself reacting under pressure. Its military apparatus still displayed resilience, but operated within a war of attrition where human, financial and logistical costs became overwhelming. And as the armed wing faltered, the political front also began to waver.

A Military Decline with Political Repercussions

Hezbollah has always grounded its legitimacy in military strength. In 1985, the year of its founding, it declared in its “Open Letter,” a kind of ideological charter, that it was not merely a party but a “nation.” From the outset, it claimed to embody a transnational Islamic project aligned with Iran’s doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic regime in Lebanon. Its enemies were explicitly named: Israel, the US, France and the Phalangists. The rhetoric was militant and uncompromising, exalting sacrifice and jihad. Every fighter was cast as part of a struggle larger than Lebanon, ready to die for Jerusalem.

Over time, this ideological fervor began to fade. Although the decline became dramatically visible after September 27, 2024, a pivotal shift in tone had already occurred years earlier. In 2009, Hezbollah’s discourse began to change. The language moved away from the dream of an Islamic order and toward a more defensive posture. The rhetoric softened. Without renouncing the principle of “resistance,” Hezbollah began to emphasize sovereignty, dignity and regional influence. Lebanon was now portrayed as a shared homeland, and the party positioned itself as an integral part of the political system, while asserting the legitimacy of its parallel military structure alongside the national army. This moment is widely recognized by scholars as a strategic turning point that marked Hezbollah’s entry into a phase of political normalization.

Today, in the aftermath of the war that began in October 2023 and especially following Nasrallah’s death in September 2024, the rhetoric has shifted once again. The soaring declarations of the Nasrallah era have given way to a defensive discourse, at times almost plaintive. The focus is now on survival, resilience and the constant Israeli threat. Gone are the grand visions of conquest or the ambition to reshape Lebanon into an Islamic model. What remains is the vocabulary of a movement under siege, intent on preserving one thing: its political survival.

On February 16, 2025, during Martyrs’ Leaders Day, Hezbollah’s new Secretary-General Naim Qassem demanded a full Israeli withdrawal and condemned restrictions on Iranian flights to Beirut, revealing the extent of the group’s logistical dependence on Tehran. On August 5, he declared that “the Resistance is strong and ready,” a phrase that sounded less like a promise of victory than a plea to endure. By mid-August, when he rejected cabinet discussions on disarmament, he conditioned any concession on an Israeli ceasefire and the adoption of a national defense strategy. In early September 2025, even as the Lebanese government endorsed the army’s plan to claim exclusive control over weapons, Qassem only referred to an “opportunity” contingent on Israeli withdrawal. This was a clear indication that Hezbollah was no longer in a position to dictate terms and was instead compelled to negotiate.

The Unraveling of a Nation’s Dream

This rhetorical shift reveals a profound transformation. Hezbollah, which in 1985 declared itself not a narrow party but a nation, and in 2009 positioned itself as an integrated actor within the Lebanese system, now appears as a besieged partisan apparatus. It has become a faction on the defensive, entangled in communal calculations and survival battles, speaking less of ambition and more of endurance.

Its agenda has narrowed to preserving parliamentary influence, defending its strongholds in the South, the Beqaa, Baalbeck-Hermel and the southern suburbs of Beirut, and sustaining the fiction of a resistance. This comes at a time when growing segments of the Lebanese population are expressing deep frustration. The 2025 municipal elections reflected this fatigue. While voter turnout remained high in Shia strongholds, participation elsewhere was low and marked by rising distrust.

Military and political fragility is compounded by financial suffocation. US sanctions have directly targeted Hezbollah’s funding networks, complicating money transfers and weakening the social redistribution system that underpins part of its legitimacy. Meanwhile, Israel accuses Iran of funneling cash-filled suitcases through Beirut’s international airport. Hezbollah has denied these allegations, perhaps falsely, but the claims underscore the vital importance of these financial flows. Once able to present itself as self-sufficient, the organization now finds itself exposed, forced to justify its sources of funding and acknowledge its growing dependence on Tehran.

Ultimately, Hassan Nasrallah’s death has laid bare a truth that many had already begun to perceive. From the vision of a resistance-nation, what remains is a faction whose survival now depends on forces it no longer controls. These include ceasefire arrangements, Israeli withdrawal, international sanctions and perhaps one day, a genuine national strategy adopted by Lebanon. The organization still retains military strength, but that strength is diminished and reactive. It remains present in the political arena, but its dominance is increasingly contested. Hezbollah has not disappeared, but it has ceased to be inevitable.