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The Lebanese cabinet heard, on Friday, a presentation from Army Chief Rodolphe Haykal on a confidential plan to monopolize arms, as tasked by the government on August 5. The cabinet then issued a statement, and Information Minister Paul Morcos held a press conference. The vague responses left observers divided, with each side interpreting the outcome differently. Some saw progress toward disarming Hezbollah, while others accused the government of stalling in collusion with the pro-Iran militia. Supporters of Hezbollah and its ally, Amal, were left uncertain about whether to support or oppose the decision. This ambiguity has fueled confusion: Will Lebanon disarm Hezbollah, or not?
To understand how we got here, we must recount the buildup.
On November 27, 2024, Lebanon and Israel signed a Cessation of Hostilities agreement, ending Hezbollah’s war with Israel and establishing a “mechanism” and timetable for disarming the militia. Within 90 days, Hezbollah was to surrender its arms, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would assume control, and Israel would withdraw from five occupied Lebanese hilltops. Yet, Hezbollah never disarmed, and Israel remained in place. Enter Barrack.
Enter U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, who committed a diplomatic blunder that has complicated Lebanon’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah.
Operating independently of the State Department and without expertise on Lebanon or Israel, Barrack drafted, in July, the “Barrack Paper,” a sequence of confidence-building measures requiring reciprocal steps from Lebanon and Israel.
Hezbollah’s ally, Speaker Nabih Berri, is far more experienced than Barrack and seized the opportunity. The resulting joint U.S.-Lebanese draft required Israel to cease policing Hezbollah early—as soon as the Lebanese cabinet voted on disarmament. Barrack also set deadlines: August 2025 for the LAF to present its plans and year-end for disarmament completion.
Barrack’s amateurism peaked when he committed Israel to halting policing and withdrawing without consulting Jerusalem, while also making inflammatory remarks, including accusing Israel of dividing Arab nations to dominate them and claiming Netanyahu whimsically brutalized non-Israelis.
Israel continued policing Hezbollah. Lebanon’s cabinet, citing Israeli strikes on Hezbollah arms depots and operatives, declared these actions violated the Barrack Paper.
When Barrack urged Israel to endorse his plan, Jerusalem found it odd to adopt a weaker mechanism when Lebanon hadn’t honored the November 2024 agreement. Still, in deference to Israel’s best ally, Netanyahu issued a statement promising positive reciprocity and support for Lebanon’s disarmament efforts, without committing to Barrack’s sequence.
But Barrack’s blunder had consequences. Berri and Hezbollah argued that since Israel didn’t commit to the Barrack Paper, Lebanon was unbound by any disarmament obligations, effectively abandoning the November mechanism and UNSCR 1701 altogether.
Thankfully, Barrack was not the only player in this game. Regional powers—wealthy Gulf states indispensable for postwarreconstruction and non-Shia Lebanese blocs—oppose Iran and Hezbollah and see a rare opportunity to disarm the militia while global attention remains on Lebanon.
On August 5 and 7, 2025, the Lebanese cabinet voted to disarm Hezbollah, despite Berri and Hezbollah’s protests and walkout. The Shia bloc later conditioned its return to cabinet meetings on reversing those votes. The cabinet defied Berri and Hezbollah again and invited Haykal to attend. When Haykal showed up, the Shia ministers left.
To counter Berri and Hezbollah’s insistence that Israel’s “violation” of Barrack’s Paper freed Lebanon of its disarmament commitments, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam argued that the cabinet had endorsed the paper’s “goal”—disarming Hezbollah—not its sequence.
Meanwhile, scant state resources further complicate the disarmament process. The LAF informed the cabinet it lacks the capacity to disarm Hezbollah by year-end. As such, the army divided Lebanon into five sectors—South of Litani, Between Litani and Awwali, the Southern Suburb, the Northern Bekaa Valley, and Beirut—estimating three months per sector, tackling one at a time. This means that disarmament will take 15 months from today, that is, December 2026.
Delayed disarmament means Lebanon will hold its parliamentary election, scheduled for May 2026, with Hezbollah retaining its weapons and thus its firm control over the Shia bloc and, by extension, parliament and the rest of the state.
Fifteen months also give Hezbollah ample time to regroup if regional dynamics shift. For this reason, most advocates for dismantling the Hezbollah militia emphasize the urgency of completing the process by March at the latest, allowing the Lebanese state to rebuild, post-Hezbollah, starting in May.
To expedite the disarmament timeline, Washington has taken action. After supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) control of most of the area south of the River Litani, the U.S. has pledged to provide more intelligence and resources to accelerate efforts as the LAF recruits to strengthen its ranks and continues to disarm the pro-Iran militia.
Critics argue the LAF’s plan lacks a clear timetable—what if Hezbollah resists militarily? Who can predict the timetable then? –and note the cabinet only “welcomed” the plan without a formal vote, which by no means invalidates the plan or the cabinet’s endorsement.
Despite all the risks and uncertainties, past, present, and future, Lebanon has been enjoying a rare “March 14” moment, with Christian President Aoun and leader Samir Geagea, Sunni Prime Minister Salam, and Druze chief Walid Jumblatt united behind disarmament. This coalition provides the state much-needed stability when countering Berri and Hezbollah.
Disarming Hezbollah won’t follow a straight path or meet a fixed deadline. Progress will ebb and flow, but the consensus—both in Lebanon and globally—to disarm Hezbollah persists, like a dim light at the end of the tunnel.
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