Recent armed clashes on the Lebanese-Syrian border have once again brought attention to the situation of Shiite clans in this region. These events have also highlighted the key role these clans play in the local social and political fabric. Who are they? How do they interact with Hezbollah and the Lebanese state?
The Shiite clans of northern Bekaa, particularly in the Baalbek-Hermel region, are characterized by a social organization based on clan affiliation. These are large families with security and economic autonomy. This structure differs from that of Shiites in southern Lebanon, whose lifestyles are primarily focused on rural and agricultural activities.
These clans are grouped into two main factions: the Chamsiyeh and the Zeaiteriyeh. The Chamsiyeh include families like the Chamas, Allouh, Dandach, Allam, Awad, Nassereddine, and Alaaeddine, while the Zeaiteriyeh consist of the Zeaiter, Jaafar, Noun, Amhaz, Mokdad, Haj Hassan, and Chreif. Historically, these groups were part of a larger confederation known as the Hamadiyeh, referring to the Hamadeh family that held dominant influence over all clans, and the Haidariyeh, linked to the Haidar family.
A Deeply Rooted Clan Culture
Retired General Khalil Helou, political analyst and geopolitics professor at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, explains to This Is Beirut: “These clans have existed for centuries and perpetuate a deeply rooted tradition. It’s a culture that has not disappeared despite the concepts of citizenship, law, and rights.”
He adds: “This affiliation, passed down from birth within the family framework, is both emotional and unconditional. It creates unshakable solidarity.” He also notes that clan affiliations in Lebanon are not about to disappear—they are rooted in history. Similar structures also exist among Sunnis and even among Maronites in the mountains.
An Autonomous Social and Political Organization
Helou describes the Shiite clans of Lebanon as sociopolitical structures where family solidarity plays a central role. “Within these clans, members help each other unconditionally,” he explains. “The strong support the weak, and families protect their own, especially in times of conflict. If a family member is harmed, for instance through assassination, the entire clan may seek revenge.” This logic explains the persistence of vendettas and the refusal to submit certain disputes to the state, which is seen as external to traditional codes.
However, these clans also have traditions of reconciliation. Helou explains that a well-established mechanism helps ease tensions: “Reconciliation between clans is always orchestrated by the elders, through concessions and financial compensation. It’s a sociopolitical structure in the strictest sense.”
He emphasizes that these clan affiliations are deeply rooted in Lebanese culture and are not limited to the Shiite community—they also extend to Sunni and Maronite communities. “These ancestral structures, although eroded by social evolution, will not disappear overnight. They remain intimately linked to the country’s history and collective identity.”
The political influence of these clans also remains significant. During legislative elections, their mobilization can heavily influence results—a factor that Hezbollah and the Amal movement strategically exploit due to their strong roots in the Shiite community.
Geography Shapes the Clans’ Fate
The history of these clans dates back to the French Mandate era. When the borders were drawn in 1920, several Lebanese localities were annexed to Syria, giving these villages a hybrid status. Many Lebanese clans from the Baalbek-Hermel region already lived on the Syrian side, where they owned and cultivated land long before independence. “This issue has never been addressed by either the Syrian or Lebanese authorities,” Helou notes.
He explains that these clans, though established across the border, largely obtained Lebanese nationality in the 1920s and 1930s. “The entire clan chose to belong to Lebanon rather than Syria,” he explains, while remaining on their Syrian lands. These clans have thus always lived on both sides of the border, particularly in the Orontes Valley (Wadi el-Assi) and in Syrian border regions near the Hermel district, such as Qasr.
Until recently, the absence of state control allowed free movement between the two countries, turning the area into a lawless zone. This security vacuum favored the rise of well-established smuggling networks. “These communities live parallel to Lebanese laws,” Mr. Helou says. “Clan dominance remains stronger than the state.”
Hezbollah and the Clans: A Relationship of Cooperation and Mistrust
The Shiite clans of the Bekaa, close to Hezbollah and the Amal movement, have long enjoyed a form of political and military immunity. Without always being affiliated with the party, they maintain a pragmatic relationship with Hezbollah, each preserving its own interests. In exchange for their support, Hezbollah provides them with financial and military assistance, thereby strengthening its influence in this strategic region.
The Bekaa, with its proximity to Syria and its history of smuggling, offers fertile ground for arms and drug trafficking—key funding sources for Hezbollah, especially since international sanctions have tightened. However, the clans maintain strong autonomy. As General Khalil Helou points out, “Clan affiliation always takes precedence over Hezbollah.” This independence is particularly evident in certain illegal activities, protected by family solidarity, which makes state intervention difficult.
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria in 2013 reinforced its grip on border villages, where fighters from the clans joined local militias to defend Shiite communities. However, after Hezbollah’s partial withdrawal and the weakening of the Syrian regime, tensions emerged. Some clans blame the party for a lack of support against Syrian forces—a factor that could redefine their relationships in the coming years.
The Lebanese State vs. the Clans: A Contested Authority
The Shiite clans of the Bekaa exhibit a strong autonomy that often surpasses the authority of the Lebanese state, taking advantage of weak security forces. Historically marginalized, these clans have forged a distinct identity rooted in clan traditions, where internal solidarity outweighs all other affiliations—including ties to Hezbollah and, even more so, to the state.
The recurring clashes between the Lebanese army and these clans underscore this dynamic. According to General Helou, recent clashes between some clans and the Syrian army occurred without Hezbollah’s official involvement, as the party distanced itself from the events. This situation confirms the clans' independent identity, making decisions based on their own interests and view of power.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese state struggles to assert its authority in a region where economic marginalization and lack of development have strengthened clan autonomy. General Khalil Helou notes that, despite state efforts to collaborate with local leaders and promote education, these initiatives remain limited and uncertain. Furthermore, UN Resolution 1680 calls for the demarcation of the Lebanon-Syria border—a matter unresolved for over a century. Beyond mere topography, this issue holds significant sociological, economic, and political dimensions.
Given these challenges, the future of the Shiite clans hinges on a fragile balance between clan traditions, state integration, and regional influences. A dialogue between the state and clan leaders could lead to better inclusion of these communities while respecting their historical identity. The situation at the Lebanese-Syrian border will remain a key factor in the country's stability.
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