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Elections matter. Only a few months ago, the Biden Administration struggled to assert its relevance amidst dramatic events in the Middle East. It had plenty to say, much of it contradictory, as it attempted to deal with the Democratic Party's split personality on Israel and the Palestinians while losing an election. The fragile ceasefires that came in the last weeks of that presidency were not the consequence of empty words, but of positioning by Middle Eastern players for the arrival of President-elect Donald Trump.
No one can say Washington is irrelevant today. The Trump Administration is all about assertiveness, but has yet to define its big-picture goals and strategy for the Middle East. Not that doctrines and 1,000-page national security strategies are all they are cracked up to be. The best U.S. foreign policy team of the past fifty years was arguably led by President George H.W. Bush in 1989-93. He famously disdained the "vision thing," yet admirably shaped the post-Cold War era to protect American interests, alongside those of a global network of allied and partner states. Everyone knew what guided him: strength, determination, prudence, proportionality, common sense, experience, and flexibility in the face of change.
President Trump has some of these ingredients, although the mix comes out differently than with Bush 41. And Trump has two features missing from the Bush profile: a zest for the unconventional and a zero-sum view of the world. Trump's rebellion against conventional boundaries in many cases is refreshing, and recognizes that conventional thinking often amounts to no thinking at all, a particular speciality of the State Department. Even senior officials in the Obama Administration, unable to lead, whined about the Washington "foreign policy blob" that always seemed to offer up the same solutions even if they never delivered results. But some conventions have lasted because they make more sense than the alternatives.
As for Trump's embrace of zero-sum calculations, it is an old line of thinking in America about the foreign sphere, a hard-nosed belief that too many partners take America for granted and enjoy free rides paid for by Americans, oversold by the "blob" as enlightened self-interest. Rebalancing burden sharing among allies has been an American bipartisan goal for decades; Trump just pursues it with a disarming directness that is finally prompting cooperation. In any case, great democracies must regularly re-examine their overseas commitments and make the case to each new generation of voters that those obligations are still relevant and worthwhile. Well-considered alliances will pass that test.
What Does All of This Mean for American Policy Toward the Middle East?
First, there is an American president who commands attention in the region and will assert American strength and relevance as and when needed. Second, he is not captive to old thinking about how to solve problems, at least when that "old thinking" has proven unequal to the task (not that his "new thinking" always quite hits the mark). Third, his instinct is to demand that U.S. partners in the region do more to address their problems with realistic strategies. America may be ready to assist, but not become again a crutch so Arab and Israeli leaders can evade their responsibility to make the choices and bear the burdens required of them. When that shift occurs, America will have a freer hand to pursue the much-discussed but elusive pivot of attention to East Asia.
Success will require a more forthright and convincing strategy than what we have so far seen. Diplomacy today, for better or worse, is mostly conducted in public. A Trump strategy for the Middle East will be stronger when it is coherently presented in a way that is understandable and attracts Americans and a majority of the people of the Middle East -- and persuades regional leaders to join up because it serves our collective interests.
Does the Trump Administration see the Middle East as an interconnected theater, or does it believe it can be broken up into component parts with disconnected micro-strategies and mini-moves? Does it understand a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity exists to make permanent the reverses the Iranian regime has suffered as a result of 15 months of tragic conflict? Does it appreciate that Syria is a cockpit of the Middle East, with the situation there having a 50-50 chance of turning out well or badly for regional stability, so we better get a little more interested? Can the Administration manage the big picture of geopolitical power in the region capably, so it gains leverage over the urgent sub-set of problems that Iran until now has exploited in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, and Sanaa? Or will it, like its predecessor, be driven by crisis management, short-term horizons, and an inability to act upon the transnational nature of the problems and opportunities in the Middle East? If so, Tehran only has to wait for Washington to lose interest and for the tide to turn again in its favor.
We don't know the answers, but there is now a rare opening for a powerful American president to succeed in the region like no other -- if he recognizes that interconnected problems require interconnected solutions and persistence.
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