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“The Cedar Revolution,” “Lebanon First,” “Culture of Connection”… These are just a few of the defining slogans that came to represent what some would call the “Beirut Spring” or the “Second Independence.” These powerful expressions emerged in the wake of a massive, popular rally held exactly 20 years ago, in the heart of Beirut. Martyrs' Square (later renamed “Freedom Square”) became the site of an extraordinary surge of public energy—a true tidal wave of people demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, for which the Assad regime was held responsible.
These three key slogans were not mere rhetorical devices. Each one reflected a distinct aspect of the political dynamics born from this historic turning point, a day that would eventually become synonymous with the sovereignty movement known as the March 14 Coalition. This was, in fact, a momentous, foundational event because, for the first time in Lebanon's modern history, we witnessed an unprecedented, trans-sectarian outpouring of popular sentiment—marking the emergence of a Lebanese national identity and the realization of a collective Lebanese consciousness.
On March 14, 2005, more than a million Lebanese—Christians, Sunnis, Druze and even a Shiite elite—from all walks of life and political affiliations, gathered in the streets, united under one flag: the Lebanese flag. They chanted the same slogans (primarily “Syria, out”) and waved banners with shared messages. This mobilization was not an isolated or fleeting event. It was followed by weeks and months of continuous action, including a persistent sit-in (marked by a festive, yet committed atmosphere) and massive protests, all contributing to a unified national struggle.
Since 1943, and even long before that, Lebanon had not witnessed such a spontaneous outpouring of collective will. The independence that marked the end of the French mandate had been characterized by the creation of a National Pact—a document meant to be foundational but which ultimately amounted to little more than a cordial agreement between two high-ranking leaders, President Bechara el-Khoury and Prime Minister Riad Solh.
This political pact, initiated at the highest levels of power, failed to translate into a lived reality at the grassroots level, where community-based experiences were concerned. On the contrary, the socio-cultural fabric of Lebanon had been torn apart over decades, weighed down by the forces of regional centrifugal currents—at times Nasserist (in the late 1950s), Palestinian (with the crisis triggered by the armed presence of the PLO) and Syrian (since the 1970s).
The momentum of March 14, 2005, and its lasting impact came to be known as the “Cedar Revolution” precisely because it represented a break from these regional forces and their centrifugal influence. It marked the emergence, for the first time, of a sovereignty movement—the “March 14 Movement”—based on an exclusively Lebanese identity, centered around the symbol of the cedar. It transcended communities and political factions, rallying around the theme “Lebanon First,” in stark contrast to transnational allegiances and regional, ideological or hegemonic interferences.
The Cedar Revolution and the slogan “Lebanon First” were not merely the direct aftermath of the February 14, 2005 assassination; rather, they were the culmination of a lengthy process that had been evolving for several years. This process began in 2001 with the reconciliation initiative between the Maronite patriarch of the time, Nasrallah Sfeir, and the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Joumblatt. This historic Maronite-Druze initiative was accompanied by the gradual development of a “culture of connection,” a concept dear to Samir Frangieh. This idea took shape through several avenues, beginning with a discreet and low-profile seminar in 2001 in Baakline, in the Chouf region. The seminar brought together leaders and student activists from the political parties and movements that would later form the March 14 Movement, including the Lebanese Forces, Kataeb, the Liberal National Party, Aounist representatives, the Future Movement, the PSP, communist students and independents.
Over the course of an entire weekend, these young people engaged in open and honest discussions in a friendly atmosphere, tackling crucial issues such as the “Syrian occupation” (a taboo subject at the time), Lebanon’s economic situation, the necessity for internal dialogue and the importance of “accepting the other.” A key precursor to the division that would emerge after March 14, 2005, was the refusal of Hezbollah and the Amal movement to participate in this seminar.
Other significant initiatives at the leadership level also marked the early stages of the March 14 Movement and the Cedar Revolution, notably the informal meetings of the “Bristol Encounter.” These gatherings showcased Rafic Hariri and Walid Joumblatt’s openness to the Christian opposition, signaling the first realization of the “culture of connection” (a move that angered the Syrian regime and its local allies).
More importantly, this Lebanese nationalist movement gained momentum with the rise of the Democratic Left, which became a key component of the March 14 Coalition. It brought together prominent figures from the left and the Communist Party, including Georges Haoui, Elias Atallah, Samir Kassir, Habib Sadek and Karim Mroué. These individuals displayed remarkable political courage by engaging in self-criticism, condemning certain positions held by the left and the National Movement of the 1970s. In 2005, this Democratic Left, together with the Future Movement, the PSP and the Christian parties, formed the broad and inclusive March 14 coalition.
However, a major challenge loomed on the horizon: the sovereignty movement would face fierce opposition from Hezbollah, which sought to undermine it through the force of arms. Hezbollah succeeded in solidifying the Shiite community by leading it down a transnational, ideologically-driven path, one that was inherently anti-Lebanese—aligning it blindly and unconditionally with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution.
This Iranian diversion caused tensions and exacerbated communal divisions, further intensified by the rapidly shifting regional dynamics. In such a context, only a decisive revival of the Shiite intellectual elite and independent thinkers could restore the spirit of March 14, putting an end to the fragmentation of Lebanon's social fabric engineered by Hezbollah, which had aligned itself with the hegemonic ambitions of the Pasdaran and the radical power bloc in Tehran.
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