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3. The Houthis, an Iranian Proxy Unlike Any Other

Often described as a group subservient to Iran, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement is, in fact, quite different. Although they share a common affiliation with Shiism, the Houthis (officially known as “Ansar Allah”) adhere to Zaydi Islam, unlike the Iranian Shiites who follow the Twelver doctrine.

However, the ties between both shiite factions strengthened over the years, particularly during the Saada war, which began in 2004, and then during the Yemeni civil war marked by Saudi Arabia’s intervention in 2015.
 

From Religion to Politics

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran sought to develop and deepen its relations with the various groups and branches of Shiism in the region. The long-term goal was to have several proxies in Arab countries where Shiites are a minority (Lebanon, Syria, Yemen) or majority, such as in Iraq. The first contacts between the Houthis and Iran date back to the 1980s and 1990s.

“There were several regular trips made by the Houthi family and militia members to Iran, particularly to Mashhad and Qom,” points out David Rigoulet-Roze, editor-in-chief of the magazine Orients stratégiques and Middle East expert. “These visits had an impact on the transformation of Zaydi thought. Because originally, there are no organic ties between Yemeni Zaydism and Iranian Twelver Shiism,” he continues.

Zaydism is a branch of Shiism that recognizes five imams and differs profoundly from Twelver Shiism. Zaydis are, in fact, the Shiites closest to Sunnis doctrinally. Initially more religious in nature, these visits would become more political. “Over the course of these contacts, there was an ideological transformation,” notes Rigoulet-Roze. “This can be seen in the near verbatim adoption of Hezbollah’s slogan: ‘God is great; death to America; death to Israel; cursed be the Jews; victory to Islam.’”

While their religious ties remain weak, the Zaydis nonetheless share with other Shiites an ideology based on a sense of oppression and injustice. After Yemen’s unification in 1990, Zaydis became a minority, now only representing 35% of the population, which led to a loss of their influence and political power, particularly in northern Yemen. They also feel threatened by Saudi attempts to spread Wahhabism in their region. In response, the Houthi movement sought to regain influence.

Support During the Saada War

The Saada war, which began in 2004, strengthened ties between the Houthis and Iran. The Houthis, feeling marginalized by the Yemeni government, demanded greater autonomy, which the government refused. Furthermore, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq reinforced their ideological affinities, based on opposition to American imperialism and Zionism.

During the Saada war, Iran was accused of supporting the movement by sending weapons and money, particularly through the presence of Iran’s “Fourth Fleet” in the Gulf of Aden. The interception of arms shipments in 2009, notably aboard the Iranian ship Mahan I and the Jihan 1 in 2013, would strengthen the Yemeni government’s suspicions of Iranian support for the Houthis. Tehran was also said to have organized training camps for the Houthis in the 2000s to teach urban guerrilla warfare and combat techniques in mountainous areas. This material and military support was formally denied by Tehran, which, however, increased its political support for the Houthis.

According to the Yemeni government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Iran used charitable groups like the Ahl al-Bayt International Community and the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization to send agents tasked with supporting the Houthis. The goal was also to spread the principles of the Islamic Republic. This objective was facilitated by the Iranian TV channel al-Alam, launched in 2003, which broadcasts in Arabic and has supported the Houthi cause in Yemen.

However, Iran’s support during the Saada war seems to have been fairly marginal, as Iran was already heavily involved on the Syrian and Iraqi fronts and suffering from international sanctions. The Yemeni civil war would push Iran to increase its support, and the influence of the Houthis would become prominent in the “axis of resistance.”

Against Saudi Intervention

After the Houthis took Sana’a in 2014, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in 2015 marked a major turning point in relations between Iran and the group. Iran sought to limit its Saudi rival’s regional influence and prevent the weakening of its ally in Yemen. This was particularly important as Yemen provided Iran with greater influence in the Red Sea, a highly strategic and essential area for international trade. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s political exploitation of the Shiite/Sunni opposition would sectarianize the conflict and, in turn, push the Houthis into the arms of their Iranian patron.

Although Iran has always denied providing military assistance to the Houthis, the US and Saudi Arabia have accused it of supplying small arms and intelligence since the beginning of the conflict. “Yemen offered a theater of action for Iran,” says Rigoulet-Roze. “The Iranians sent Hezbollah operatives to the Houthis, and there were also members of the Revolutionary Guards sent. But Iran wanted to avoid leaving direct proof of its intervention, so it preferred to send Hezbollah operatives, which was easier and less detectable since they are Arabic speakers. So, there was a form of ‘Hezbollahization’ of the Houthis.”

Thanks to Hezbollah and Iranian assistance, the Houthis became a true army capable of building their own weapon factories and producing missiles and drones. They ensured their production by receiving spare parts from Iran and through smuggling from China and North Korea. This information was confirmed by a confidential US report cited by Reuters in 2024, which states that “multiple testimonies gathered by the military experts panel, Yemeni officials, and even individuals close to the Houthis indicate that they do not have the capability to develop and produce complex weapon systems without foreign support,” while emphasizing the support from Iran and Hezbollah.

With the outbreak of the Gaza war, Iran also reportedly provided logistical support to the Houthis and trained them to target ships in the Red Sea. According to British daily The Telegraph, at least 200 Houthis were trained at the Khameini Academy of Naval Sciences and Technology on the Caspian coast in 2020. They reportedly received naval training under the supervision of the Qods Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Furthermore, Iran would guide the targeting of foreign ships via the Behshad ship, which has been stationed in the Red Sea since 2021. Posing as a commercial vessel, it supposedly carries out espionage and ship identification missions, according to international experts. In a 2023 interview, White House National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson stated that without Iranian assistance, the Houthis “would have difficulty detecting and hitting” ships operating in the Red Sea.

While there is a clear link between Iran and the Houthis, the Yemeni movement is not entirely subservient to Tehran. “This is not a classic proxy; the Houthis are not like Hezbollah, for example. They have a specific identity and also an agenda that fits within the Yemeni national chessboard; they are not fully aligned with the Iranian agenda,” confirms Rigoulet-Roze. “This allows the Iranians to claim they are autonomous. It’s not a proxy in the classic sense, rather it is a proxy with its own logic that goes beyond Iran’s regional geopolitical considerations,” he adds.

Indeed, the Houthis primarily pursue national goals, with the intention of reclaiming control of northern Yemen. This was an objective they were already pursuing before they established strong ties with Iran. They also wish to be recognized by the international community as major and legitimate actors in their country.

Thus, rather than an Iranian proxy, the Houthis are a movement distinct from Tehran, but one that voluntarily collaborates with it, both for their own internal interests and due to the convergence of struggles within the “axis of resistance” on the international level.