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The presidential election set to take place next October should decisively test the ability of Ivorian democracy – representing a population of 32 million – to overcome the lingering shadows of the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis and lay the groundwork for a society reconciled with its history.
The current regime’s strong economic record, the genuine political pluralism, the maturity of the political class and real freedom of expression are the strongest guarantees of the country’s stability as it enters a highly contested electoral campaign in an atmosphere of apparent calm.
During the 2020 presidential election, massive protests resulted in dozens of deaths as unidentified gangs, referred to as “les microbes” by the public, attacked young people in the streets. The opposition chose to boycott the vote. The result: Alassane Ouattara was elected to a disputed third term, to the extent that Emmanuel Macron took ten days to congratulate the winner, who secured 94% of the vote in a climate of fear and widespread abstention.
The upcoming presidential election in October is expected to be more virtuous. President Ouattara’s Côte d’Ivoire possesses numerous strengths to meet what appears to be a formidable democratic challenge: undeniable economic success, as evidenced by the regime’s numerous achievements; an open political debate – although, as in many places, YouTubers operating independently play a central but erratic role in political discourse; and an international openness that has in no way distanced the country from its traditional partners.
While other leaders return from China with only modest financing promises, Ouattara secured several billion CFA francs in Beijing to improve infrastructure and rehabilitate 3,500 kilometers of roads. In a surprising shift, Italy has become Côte d’Ivoire’s leading trade partner, surpassing France and Morocco.
However, a growing divide exists between the Ivorian government and the disadvantaged youth in urban neighborhoods. Just this past January, clashes erupted between groups of young people and gendarmes in Bettié, a locality 166 kilometers from Abidjan. The local gendarmerie was completely destroyed and around a hundred protesters were arrested. “Côte d’Ivoire must integrate 300,000 young people into the labor market each year,” French diplomats argue, acknowledging real efforts to expand educational infrastructure and strengthen the small and medium-sized business sector in a country still largely dominated by major international corporations.
More broadly, the path to inclusive and equitable growth remains long and arduous. The benefits of strong economic growth have only partially reached the majority of the population. As Ahoua Don Mello, the Ivorian representative for the BRICS in Africa, explains, “Côte d’Ivoire, the third-largest economy in West Africa, ranks sixth in human development after Cape Verde (1st), Ghana (2nd), Nigeria (3rd), Mauritania (4th) and Benin (5th). This reflects the limited socio-economic participation of citizens in the development process, even as three French companies and their allies are set to collect 1,000 billion CFA francs for the construction of just 37 kilometers of railway.”
The Ivorian President’s Uncertainties
For now, after three terms, Ouattara remains ambiguous about running in the next presidential election. Is it a desire to see his economic successes amplified by the recent discovery of oil and gold deposits, or the fear of leaving his political camp vulnerable and leaderless? During an official ceremony earlier this year in Abidjan, the head of state hinted at the possibility of a fourth term: “I am in good health and eager to serve my country.” Immediately afterward, with his usual tactical finesse – acknowledged even by his opponents – the Ivorian president struck a more cautious tone: “As of today, I have not yet made my decision.” Perhaps he will be more forthcoming during his meeting with his ally and friend Emmanuel Macron in Paris on February 1.
The president’s statement is widely interpreted in Abidjan’s diplomatic circles as a declaration of candidacy. Furthermore, the first signs indicate total support from his party, the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), whose senior members are struggling to find a worthy successor. As early as last October, top RHDP officials had already designated him as their “natural candidate,” expressing their “determination to do everything possible” to secure his victory in the upcoming election.
Laurent Gbagbo, a Thorn in Multiparty Politics
On June 17, 2021, Laurent Gbagbo, having been acquitted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), was allowed to return to Côte d’Ivoire. This marked a significant step toward national reconciliation by President Ouattara. However, by convicting the former president and declaring him ineligible over a bank heist during the 2010-2011 crisis, the Ivorian judiciary effectively blocked the normalization of Ivorian political life. “Such a measure is completely discriminatory,” argues an opposition member. “The former president was found not guilty by the ICC for his actions during our civil war. Our judges must respect international justice.”
A toxic standoff has developed between Ouattara and Gbagbo. The former appears unwilling to grant his rival a pardon that would allow him to run, while the latter – who tightly controls his party in a manner reminiscent of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France – refuses to designate a successor, unlike Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko, who was imprisoned before the recent presidential election in Dakar.
As a seasoned strategist, Gbagbo fuels unrest, encourages street protests against the government and follows a strategy of provocation. In the event of violent demonstrations, only the underprivileged youth – used as cannon fodder – would pay the price for his intransigence, without achieving any tangible political gains.
The result: neither of the two dominant figures in Ivorian politics is currently on the starting line, or willing to pass the torch. Meanwhile, divisions within the Ivorian political class continue to deepen.
A Leadership Crisis
On the left of the political spectrum, no fewer than five parties – including those of Gbagbo and his ex-wife Simone, who are irreparably at odds – are competing for voters. The alliance formed in 2018 between the parties of former Presidents Bédié and Gbagbo did not survive Bédié’s death in 2023. No opposition movement has yet emerged as a serious challenger to the government. Côte d’Ivoire thus faces a leadership vacuum.
The main opposition force, the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), is experiencing internal turmoil. Tidjane Thiam, Bédié’s successor, expected his candidacy to be automatically accepted. However, Jean-Louis Billon, a businessman, former minister and influential party figure, insists on a democratic primary.
This internal dispute highlights a fundamental disagreement: Thiam appears to want to avoid intra-party competition, while Billon advocates for a democratic process that could rally broader support.
Ethnic Fragmentation
The 60 ethnic groups that have historically shaped Ivorian politics complicate political alliances. Additionally, the presence of Lebanese, Burkinabé, Nigeriens and Malians – who make up 30% of the population – adds another layer of complexity to national cohesion.
During Houphouët-Boigny’s rule, political dynamics were structured around an East/West divide, with the Baoulé (to which Bédié belonged) and Akan in the East aligned against the Bété and Krou, who supported Gbagbo, in the West. Meanwhile, the North – home to the Malinké – was politically marginalized. Ouattara’s rise to power changed this, as his RHDP formed an alliance with the PDCI.
Despite these shifting alliances, the presence of Sahelian migrants in electoral rolls has strengthened Ouattara’s Malinké support base. Nevertheless, growing urbanization, population movements and increasing social unrest have blurred these traditional ethnic and regional divisions.
Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic success is critical for Africa’s globalization while upholding human rights – and for France’s hope of maintaining stable, equal and cooperative relations with a dynamic, francophone partner.
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