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3. Navigating the Uncertainties of the Post-Assad Era

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had anticipated it well before Bashar al-Assad's downfall, pointing to the emergence of a new Middle East. Likewise, President-elect Donald Trump had set the tone during his campaign, emphasizing his commitment to forging peace in a region beset by over seven decades of armed conflict and largely ineffective military maneuvers—particularly on the Arab side.

The anticipated transformation momentum appears to be unfolding faster than expected. This perception stems from the drastic upheavals that have accelerated in recent weeks. In just two months, Israel dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah’s entire structure, dismantling much of the infrastructure built in Lebanon over four decades by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Following this, in what appears to be a carefully orchestrated series of events, the Syrian rebellion—with active Turkish support and likely tacit approval from the United States and Israel—needed just 10 days to dismantle half a century of Assad family rule. Indeed, the genesis of a new Middle East seems to be unfolding at a remarkable pace.

While attention will soon turn to Iran, particularly regarding its nuclear program, as well as to Iraq and Yemen, where Iranian-backed proxies remain active, Syria is now the immediate focal point. Analysts are keenly observing the shifting local and regional power dynamics to understand the shape of the emerging post-Assad order.

Some undeniable truths outline the contours of a new socio-geopolitical reality on the horizon. The fall of Damascus to rebel forces has inflicted a severe—potentially fatal—blow to the Islamic Revolution's export strategy, launched by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) following Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascent to power in 1979. This strategy relied heavily on the pivotal roles of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes as strategic anchors and operational hubs for Iranian expansionism, and on the establishment of proxies in Arab countries, with Hezbollah as its most prominent instrument. These proxies were designed to confront the United States and Israel indirectly, avoiding direct bilateral conflict with the latter.

This approach went hand in hand with a rapid iranization—or even shiitization—of societies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, alongside widespread population displacements and demographic shifts.

Now, in less than three months, the Pasdaran have lost two central pillars of their strategy: the Syrian regime and Hezbollah’s capacity to exert influence. The Alawites, who formed the cornerstone of Tehran’s minority alliance, have lost their hold on power after over five decades, while the Sunni majority is reclaiming its prominence along the Barada River.

This dramatic shift has effectively shattered the so-called “Shiite Crescent” (Iranian influence), a threat first highlighted by King Abdallah II of Jordan in December 2004. In geostrategic terms, this radical change marks a significant retreat for the Pasdaran and the emergence of Turkey as a key player at the heart of the Near East.

A new and complex equation, laden with uncertainties, is thus taking shape. Will Ankara’s Islamist regime choose to bolster radical Islamist factions in Damascus, sowing the seeds of yet another creeping destabilization that could reignite tensions with the United States and Israel? Or, conversely, will President Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopt a pragmatic approach, tipping the scales in favor of the moderate and “liberal” (?) factions of the new Syrian leadership? Such a move could pave the way for cordial and constructive relations with neighboring countries, including Lebanon—and perhaps even Israel.

This path, however, would require a significant alignment of interests among key players: the United States, Israel, Turkey and likely Saudi Arabia, as another influential Sunni power in the region. Meanwhile, the question remains whether Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) will acknowledge their failure and focus on leading Iran toward a long-overdue societal and economic revival, restoring its historical prominence.

Alternatively, the Pasdaran could attempt to regain lost influence, following a strategy similar to their engagement with Hamas, by aligning with hardline Syrian jihadists who persist in their anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric. The risk of such a resurgence cannot be ignored, as it threatens to rekindle regional tensions.

The only way to preclude such a pendulum swing is to decisively neutralize the obstructionist leadership within Iran. Will President Trump, together with the Israeli government, move forward with their vision for a New Middle East? A vision grounded in sustainable peace, underpinned by a return to the two-state solution outlined in the Oslo Accords.

Despite resistance from Israel’s far-right, this remains the sole viable option today to spare the region's populations from enduring yet another destructive escalation—one with far-reaching and catastrophic consequences.