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3. Abolish the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council Immediately!

A popular uprising began on March 14, 2005, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on Monday, February 14, 2005. Fingers were pointed at Hezbollah and, behind it, Syria. People took to the streets en masse, demanding the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from Lebanon, ending nearly 30 years of Syrian presence in Lebanon.

Syrian presence in Lebanon dates back to 1976, a year after the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. Syrian forces entered Lebanon as part of the Arab Deterrent Forces, and the Syrian government successfully cemented its presence. This was later consolidated by the Arab League mandate under the Taif Agreement, signed on October 22, 1989, which justified the Syrian presence in Lebanon under the pretext of ending the civil war. Over nearly 15 years, Lebanon was occupied by more than 14,000 Syrian soldiers, in addition to thousands of intelligence operatives affiliated with the Assad regime.

Years of Syrian occupation established channels of corruption, theft and brokerage in Lebanon, facilitated by Syrian oversight and Lebanese implementation. A cohesive black financial structure emerged, beginning in Damascus, passing through Anjar, and spreading its networks across Lebanon. During the occupation, Lebanese institutions were forced to pay monthly tributes to Syrian officers. Around 5,000 officers, assisted by Lebanese collaborators, infiltrated 140 centers, administrations and institutions in Lebanon. The Assad regime controlled all Lebanese institutions, leading to the plundering of Lebanon’s economic resources and the entrenchment of political, financial and administrative corruption as a structural practice in politics, economics and governance.

Figures indicate that the looting of Lebanon’s economy by the Syrian security elite after the Taif Agreement is estimated at approximately $2 billion annually. The money went to the pillars of the Syrian Ba’athist regime and its cronies in Lebanon. According to unofficial sources, these funds included part of the revenues from electricity bill collections and telephone piracy through two companies linked to Syria. Tens of millions of dollars in phone revenues were transferred monthly from Lebanon to the Syrian regime, along with tributes imposed by Syrian officers on fuel imports and importing companies. Furthermore, Assad regime loyalists shared revenues from Casino du Liban and imposed tributes on highway contracts at exorbitant prices, awarded to contractors loyal to the regime.

One example is Middle East Airlines, whose workforce once ballooned to 4,000 employees for a fleet of just nine planes due to politically motivated employment imposed by Syrian regime loyalists in Lebanon. The company managed to downsize its workforce significantly in 2001 and corrected its financial situation. Other cases include fictitious land acquisitions and tributes imposed by Anjar loyalists at Beirut Port and Rafik Hariri International Airport.

These same individuals flooded the Lebanese market with cheap Syrian goods without paying customs duties. Memoirs by Abdul Halim Khaddam, who served as “Vice President” before resigning in 2005, claim that the amounts stolen by the Syrian presidential entourage during the occupation exceeded $20 billion. A leaked secret French diplomatic report dated March 16, 2005, and published after the Syrian Army’s withdrawal from Lebanon, revealed that Syrian intelligence officers, their sons and partners withdrew approximately $400 million from Lebanese banks before leaving following the assassination of Hariri.

These funds were amassed through imposed tributes, brokerage in Lebanese infrastructure projects, arms and drug trafficking, trade dealings with Saddam Hussein’s regime and oil smuggling. The case of Bank al-Madina also comes to mind, with reports suggesting that stolen funds from the bank ranged between $800 million and $1 billion, with Assad regime affiliates taking the lion’s share.

All these thefts raise questions about the need for the Lebanese state to prepare files to demand compensation from Syria for years of occupation and plundering.

After the civil war ended, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Lebanese President Elias Hrawi signed an agreement in May 1991 called the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Lebanon and Syria.” This treaty led to multiple agreements and protocols between the two countries, including the creation of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council. However, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria in 2008 and the decision to open embassies in both states raised questions about the continued relevance of this council.

The council was created during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and symbolizes a dark era, serving as a gateway for wasteful spending. Indeed, the council’s budget approached 900 million Lebanese pounds, or roughly $600,000 before the currency collapse. According to the 2012 budget draft under the Prime Minister’s Office, the council’s allocation was 850 million pounds, equivalent to $550,000.

From 2015 to 2017, its budget remained at 885 million pounds, according to Information International, dropping to 708 million pounds in 2018 before rising to 796.5 million pounds in 2019 and declining again to 716.85 million pounds in 2020 and 2021. The council employs 22 people, split equally — in theory — between Lebanese and Syrians, but according to Information International, the Syrian employees outnumber the Lebanese.

Today, the council must be abolished, as it no longer serves any purpose, especially after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This council has always been a source of controversy among Lebanese political circles opposed to Syrian dominance over Lebanon’s political, economic and security sectors. Now, its continued existence represents a political and financial burden on the Lebanese state, which is already overwhelmed by financial crises.