- 09
- Dec.
- 2024
Now that Bashar al-Assad's dictatorial regime has been overthrown, imagining what the “day after” might look like remains a challenge. Even more uncertain is the model of governance that could take shape in a post-Assad Syria.
The rebel factions, collectively referred to as the “opposition forces,” form a disparate, profoundly heterogeneous coalition, divided by different goals, political visions and even ideological outlooks. Further complicating matters is the decisive influence of external powers, whose spheres of control and geostrategic interests weigh heavily on Syria’s future.
This upheaval raises a twofold question: what geopolitical factors precipitated the collapse of Assad's regime, and what role will external powers play in shaping Syria's future governance model?
The timing behind the lightning offensive that toppled Assad's regime can, in part, be viewed as a direct consequence of the events of October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel.
In response, Tel Aviv adopted a two-pronged offensive strategy. On one hand, it waged war on Gaza – a campaign that, while seizing the attention of the international community, backfired diplomatically. Israel faced accusations of genocide and became the subject of legal action before international judicial bodies. On the other hand, it carried out a targeted and systematic military campaign against key components of Iran's so-called “axis of resistance.”
Benjamin Netanyahu began this offensive by targeting Syria, considered the most vulnerable link. Using precision strikes guided by advanced intelligence technology, Israel eliminated several Iranian Revolutionary Guard generals in Damascus last spring and in Lebanon from July until the ceasefire on November 27.
As a result, the war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel played a key role in reshaping the regional landscape. Hezbollah, a central pillar of the “axis of resistance,” suffered unprecedented losses, culminating in the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, which left the Iran-backed movement without its command structure and severely weakened its fighting capacity. However, the catalyst for this decline was the “beeper affair:” Israel carefully coordinated the simultaneous detonation of thousands of beepers worn by Hezbollah’s lieutenants and commanders in Lebanon, wounding many mid-ranking officials and severely disrupting the group’s operational networks. Confronted with this crisis, Hezbollah was forced to quickly recall its operatives from Syria in an attempt to replenish its ranks in Lebanon, all while engaged in an ongoing war with Israel. This move further deepened the vulnerability of the Syrian regime, which was left to cope on its own.
Iran, the main loser
As a result, Iran stands as the primary loser from the collapse of the Syrian regime. The strategic corridor linking the four countries that make up its “axis of resistance” – Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon – has been disrupted, depriving Tehran of a critical route for transporting weapons, military equipment, funds and personnel.
This break was solidified, under US influence and with the support of Kurdish forces, by the establishment of a buffer zone stretching from Bou Kamal to Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra. This shift effectively ended Iran’s influence in this key region, while Tehran's geostrategic presence in Syria had already been significantly diminished by the recent upheavals. Hezbollah, once a major regional force, saw its role decline, weakened by its involvement in the war against Israel, which forced it to retreat to Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the main rebel force that took control of Damascus, remains firmly opposed to Iranian influence.
These dynamics now compel Tehran to reassess its regional strategy, severely impacted by the ongoing changes, and to reconsider its position within the Middle East's shifting geopolitical landscape. As a result, Iran’s role in any post-Assad governance remains uncertain, if not completely diminished.
If Assad's regime has managed to survive since the onset of the civil war in 2011, it is largely due to the decisive support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah, bolstered by Russia’s strategic backing. Moscow played a key role in the country, first in 2013 to preserve the regime against existential threats, and then through direct military intervention in 2015, which marked a turning point in favor of Assad.
However, since February 2022, the Kremlin's priorities have shifted toward Ukraine, as the unrelenting war of attrition now consumes the bulk of its resources.
Over the past two years, Russia has gradually redeployed its troops and equipment stationed in Syria. Recently, its six warships based in Tartus left the Mediterranean to avoid being seized.
At the same time, Moscow risks losing its strategic bases in Syria, including the naval bases in Tartus and Latakia and the Hmeimim airbase, calling into question its geopolitical presence and sphere of influence in the region.
This gradual withdrawal marks a significant setback for Moscow, threatening one of its key strategic investments. As a result, Russia emerges as the second major loser from the collapse of Assad’s regime.
As political scientist and expert on the Arab world Gilles Kepel argues, Vladimir Putin was exposed as a “colossus with feet of clay.”
Given the uncertainties surrounding the sustainability of Russia’s military presence in Syria, the question of its role in a post-Assad governance remains unanswered. What was once the cornerstone of Russia's legitimacy in the region’s political dynamics is now increasingly undermined by larger strategic and geopolitical challenges.
As for the United States, currently in a transition period between administrations, there is the potential for a shift in policy direction under President-elect Donald Trump, known for being unpredictable.
During his recent campaign, Trump reiterated his promise to withdraw US troops from Syria, a commitment made in 2016 but never fulfilled due to opposition from Pentagon generals. In a recent post on social media platform X, he defended a non-interventionist stance, labeling the Syrian issue as a “local problem not warranting American involvement.” However, despite Trump's statements, Washington currently maintains a military presence in northeastern Syria and exerts significant influence through its alliances with Kurdish factions. This situation also raises uncertainties about the role the US would play in a post-Assad governance.
As a key regional geostrategic actor, Israel’s primary objective appears to be the creation of a demilitarized zone along its borders with Lebanon and Syria, thereby bolstering its national security.
Already in control of the 14-kilometer exclusion zone in the Golan and Mount Hermon since Sunday, Israel has stepped up its airstrikes on Syria, targeting military equipment depots of the former regime, particularly those housing long-range missiles that could threaten its territory.
In this context, Israel seeks to prevent any rebuilding of the Syrian army with significant offensive capabilities, especially ballistic missile systems.
While Tel Aviv is not expected to play a direct role in post-Assad governance, it could still influence the region’s geostrategic and geopolitical balance if its security is threatened. However, it appears highly unlikely that HTS’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, would prioritize Israel, as he will probably be focused on the challenges of navigating Syria's internal political reshaping.
Finally, Turkey plays a pivotal role in Syria's political landscape, exerting considerable influence over key factions, notably the Syrian National Army (SNA). Since the onset of the civil war, the Turkish military has conducted several cross-border interventions, primarily against Syrian Kurdish forces, and has effectively established a de facto Turkish-controlled zone along Syria's northern border.
Currently, Turkey seems to prioritize the establishment of a buffer zone in northeastern Syria, aimed at containing Kurdish influence while securing its own areas of intervention in northwestern Syria.
Consequently, through its influence over key political factions, Turkey is likely to seek a role in post-Assad governance, viewing it as a means to ensure the security of its borders.
In summary, the two biggest losers from the collapse of Assad's regime appear to be Russia and Iran, whose roles in any potential post-Assad governance remain highly uncertain. As for the US, the unpredictability of its elected president only adds to the ambiguity of its position. Israel, on the other hand, will continue to play a leading geostrategic and geopolitical role, as a military power capable of shifting regional balances at any moment to ensure its security. Meanwhile, Turkey will seek to assert itself in post-Assad governance, driven by the need to secure its borders.
However, many questions remain unresolved, and it would be too soon to characterize this as a transitional phase, given the persistent uncertainties.
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